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JOHN J. PERADOTTO meager claim to originality is the formal arrangement of content derived from a variety of sources. Indeed, it comes close to being a pastiche of quotations, and attempts to give in the teaching arena a faint sense of the free-play mentioned by Derrida, without fully pursuing its vertiginous implications. It was designed with a general undergraduate audience in mind, particularly one which might be currently involved in a myth course, or at least one which might have had some minimal introduction to the study of myth. But I should add that, on the occasions when this piece was delivered, there was substantial attendance by faculty members, who tended for the most part to be appreciative, though it would be less than honest not to admit that there were some who considered it simplistic. One perhaps inevitably courts such a charge when faculty attend lectures designed for undergraduates, especially one that leaves so many questions unanswered.
In the way this mainly propaedeutic lecture mixes cognitive content to be mastered and affective, maieutic, performative stimuli of interest, there is an unabashed preponderance of the latter. It is the business of education to proceed through gradual stages of diminishing credulity, and unless there is genuine interest, especially at the beginning, the process can fail to overcome inertia through early overloading with theoretical abstractness or with subtle discriminations proper to more advanced stages. It is probably safe to say that not all of our students will be intellectually disposed finally to enjoy the more complex play of ideas at the cutting edge of this kind of discussion. Not all students ever truly enjoyed the traditional metaphysics and epistemology now thought to be threatened by structuralist and post-structuralist movements. But that can surely be no excuse for persisting in the kind of ascetic positivism which refuses to give our students some sense for the methods and models currently being brought to the study of language, myth, and other social codes. What follows rests on the conviction that there is much both to gain and to give, certainly little to lose, in openness to the work of our colleagues in other disciplines. * * * * *
The study of the language of narrative-of stories, of myth-has in our time taken a radical turn. By the language of stories, I do not mean the words and sentences used to tell stories. I mean to suggest rather that stories-especially the oldest of them, myths-have grammatical rules governing their composition-grammatical rules something like those we use, whether consciously or unconsciously, when we compose sentences. As Walter Otto has said: "Language and myth cannot be separated from each other." Language, he goes on to say, must be understood as myth, and myth as language.8
Myths and stories, in this view, are not then the product of a human imagination endowed with a boundless creative power, but rather the product of combining and re-combining a finite set of story-units, according to combinatorial rules as strict as those of linguistic grammar. We all know the story of Apollo and Daphne-how the god fell in love with an unwilling girl, and how, as he pursued her, she changed into a laurel tree, as in this version of the tale by James Russell Lowell ("Fable for Critics"):
Phoebus, sitting one day in a laurel tree's shade, Was reminded of Daphne, of whom it was made, For the god being one day too warm in his wooing, She took to the tree to escape his pursuing; Be the cause what it might, from his offers she shrunk, And, Ginevra-like, shut herself up in a trunk; And, though 'twas a step into which he had driven her, He somehow or other had never forgiven her; Her memory he nursed as a kind of a tonic, Something bitter to chew when he'd play the Byronic, And I can't count the obstinate nymphs that he brought over By a strange kind of smile he put on when he thought of her. "My case is like Dido's," he sometimes remarked; "When I last saw my love, she was fairly embarked In a laurel, as she thought-but (ah, how Fate mocks!) She has found it by this time a very bad box; Let hunters from me take this saw when they need it,-You're not always sure of your game when you've treed it. Just conceive such a change taking place in one's mistress! What romance would be left? -Who can flatter or kiss trees? And, for mercy's sake, how could one keep up a dialogue With a dull wooden thing that will live and will die a log,-Not to say that the thought would forever intrude That you've less chance to win her the more she is wood? Ah! It went to my heart, and the memory still grieves, To see those loved graces all taking their leaves; Those charms beyond speech, so enchanting but now, As they left me forever, each making its bough! If her tongue had a tang sometimes more than was right, Her new bark is worse than ten times her old bite." I shall ask you in a short while to recall your reaction to the punning in these verses, but for now we are concerned with the narrative line, the story. It has become so imbedded in the texture of Western narrative and art, so congenial to its thought, that we find it difficult to ask what its hidden, true import might in fact be, or to admit that it is no less outlandish or irrational than primitive tales of men changed into alligators or the giant frog who swallows the world. A more recent example still: the novelist, John Barth, who won a National Book Award with a trilogy of mythological tales called Chimera, in his earlier Menelaiad takes the tale of the Greek hero Menelaus clinging to the shy metamor-phic sea-god Proteus and turns it into stylistic fun. As in Odyssey 4, Menelaus is telling the story to Telemachus and Nestor's son Peisistratus. Menelaus and his men, so his story goes, are disguised in seal skins on the beach, waiting to capture prophetic Proteus among his seals. Note parenthetically how the complex transformations of Proteus are matched by the Protean complexities of Barth's syntax: both equally hard to hold on to.
Come shadeless noon, unless I dreamed it, the sea-cow harem flipped from the deep to snooze on the foreshore, give me a woman anytime. Old Proteus came after, no accounting for tastes, counted them over, counting us in, old age is hard on the eyes too; then he outstretched in the cavemouth, one snore and I jumped him.
"Got you!" I cried. . .My companions, when I hollered grabbed hold too: one snatched his beard, one his hands, one his long white hair; I tackled his legs and held fast. First he changed into a lion, ate the beard-man, what a mess; then snake, bit the hair-chap, who'd nothing to hold onto.
"Neither did the hand-man," observed Peisistratus, sleepless critic, to whom I explained for Telemachus's sake as well that while the erstwhile hand-man, latterly paw-man, had admittedly been vulnerably under both lion and snake and the hair-then mane-man relatively safely on top, the former had escaped the former by reason of the quondam beard-man's fortunate, for the quondam paw-man, interposition; the latter fallen prey to the latter by reason of the latter's unfortunate, for the quondam mane-man, proclivity to strike whatever was before him-which would have been to say, before, the hand-paw-man, but was to say, now, which is to say, then, the beard-mane-man, thanks so to speak to the serpent's windings upon itself.
To clutch the leopard Proteus turned into then, then, were only myself and the unhandled hand-man, paw-once more but shielded now by neither beard-nor mane-and so Once again, the story seems so congenial to our taste in narrative that we are not driven to ask what it means. In our justifiable joy at Barth's story-telling we may grow restive with interpretations that roil their placid surface to discover, as the Freudians do, dark irrational drives beneath. Some of us may get annoyed to hear from psychoanalytic critics that "Little Red Riding Hood" is "a menstruation-copulation drama about women who hate men and sex," 9 or that "Jack and the Beanstalk" is "a compensatory fantasy of phallic amplitude" followed by self-divestiture of phallic attributes.'0 But what happens when we encounter a truly alien tale, one out of the mainstream of Western narrative traditions, one that does not appear to follow the same rules as the Apollo-Daphne or Proteus stories, one as meaningless to us as an utterance in a foreign language, one like this: "
In the days when diseases were still unknown and human beings were unacquainted with suffering, an adolescent boy obstinately refused to frequent the men's house and remained shut up in the family hut.
Irritated by this behavior, his grandmother came every night while he was asleep and, crouching above her grandson's face, poisoned him by emissions of intestinal gas. The boy heard the noise and smelled the stench, but did not understand where it was coming from. Having become sick, emaciated, and suspicious, he feigned sleep and finally discovered the old woman's trick. He killed her with a sharp-pointed arrow which he plunged so deeply into her anus that the intestines spurted out.
With the help of armadillos he secretly dug a grave in which he buried the body, just where the old woman used to sleep, and covered the newly dug earth with a mat.
That same day the Indians organized an expedition to 'poison' fish and so obtained food for their dinner. The day after the murder the women returned to the fishing ground in order to gather the remaining dead fish. Before leaving, the hero's sister wanted to put her young son in the grandmother's care: the grandmother did not answer her call and for good reason. So she set her child on the branch of a tree and told him to wait there until she came back. The child, having been left alone, changed into an anthill.
The river was full of dead fish, but instead of making several trips back and forth in order to transport them as her companions did, she ate them voraciously. Her stomach started to swell, and she began to feel acute pains.
So she moaned, and as she uttered her moans, diseases were released from her body: all the diseases, with which she infected the village, sowed death among men. This is how diseases originated.
The guilty woman's two brothers decided to kill her with spikes. One cut off her head and threw it into a lake to the east; the other cut off her legs and threw them into a lake to the west. And both drove their spikes into the ground. That story seems not simply to invite interpretation, but to cry out for it, in a way that the Daphne and Proteus tales do not. In fact, our imme- Twain's delicious irony here makes clear not only Jim's failure to understand the nature of language difference, but both Jim's and Huck's failure to understand that language is not natural (a word Huck uses three times), but conventional. Now while we may be sophisticated enough to rise above such naivete, we may, some of us, find ourselves making Jim's mistake when it comes to modes of discourse other than language, but governed by rules analogous to it-modes of discourse or social interaction we are not in the custom of considering discourse at all: activities like eating, wearing clothes, choosing sexual partners, telling stories, so that we might say, not, like Jim, "Why doan he talk like a man?", but-just as bad-"Why doesn't he eat like a man?" or "Why doesn't he dress like a man?" or "Why doesn't he refrain from incest?" or "Why does he insist on telling such obscene and meaningless stories?". Most of us, I hope, will have risen above even that naivete only to find ourselves harboring a more refined illusion-the view that, This set of categories is disturbing (our laughter is in this case an index of our disturbance), not simply because it represents an organization of animals that differs considerably from the basically Linnaean taxonomy we use, but more profoundly because each of these categories implies a grouping principle which we recognize (whether consciously or unconsciously), and which, when it is subverted by a contradictory grouping principle in another category, leads to constant cognitive disorientation and confusion. For example,'3 the first classification-"those belonging to the Emperor"-we expect to be followed by either "those that do not" or any category in the form "those that belong to X," such as "those that belong to the Empress." But no such grouping follows. Instead, we get "embalmed ones." which further destroys our expectation of a grouping of animals without respect to their being alive or dead. The category "mermaids" forces us to adjust our expectation that this classification contains only "real" animals. The very next category "fabulous" forces a further adjustment, for if "fabulous ones" are different from "mermaids," then users of this taxonomy consider mermaids real. The real cognitive scandal occurs in the category of "those included in the present classification," which seems like an insane perversion of logical sets that are members of themselves, and which seems to collapse all the previous categories into itself and to eliminate altogether the rationale behind this or any classification. But even that expectation is mocked, for the list goes on-with a category of animals "which behave like madmen." By this time, we're in the mood to re-label this group "those which behave like the inventor of this classification"! Finally, when we reach the group labelled "et cetera," we expect the list to endan expectation based not upon our own cultural arrangement of the animal kingdom, or even upon any hypothetical understanding of how the animal kingdom might be viewed by the author of the Celestial Emporium, but rather on the very structure of the list itself. When the list continues with two more categories, we are left with all our expectations dashed, even the most logically fundamental of them. Any further disorientation seems so anti-climactic that we may lack enough critical assurance even to ask of category m): how long do animals "which have just broken a flower vase" remain in that category?
And yet, this set of categories is a masterpiece: it is all-inclusive; it contains no anomalies; it appears to allow for easy migration from one class to another. child's first and continuing problem is to determine the initial boundary. 'What am I, as against the world?' 'Where is the edge of me?' In this fundamental sense, feces, urine, semen, and so forth, are both me and not me. So strong is the resulting taboo that, even as an adult addressing an adult audience, I cannot refer to these substances by the monosyllabic words which I used as a child but must mention them only in Latin.'7 And Latin, as we know, is the language of repression! At the level of language, puns can be considered in the same way-as verbal "dirt," if you will. Recall for a moment your reaction to the proliferation of puns in the Apollo-Daphne poem with which this lecture opened: on the one hand, you were amused-the puns are, after all, funny, the focus of interest. On the other hand, you doubtless felt socially obliged to demonstrate your disdain for them, supporting the conventional view of them as the lowest form of humor. But, we may ask, why are they or should they be considered the lowest form of humor? After all, that has not always been the case. Widespread disdain for the pun dates only from the so-called age of the Enlightenment. Before that, in the language of poetry and religion, it is generally held in the highest esteem. Much of the pun's interest appears to lie in its violation of strict linguistic categories-its ambiguous habitation on the tabooed border area between words, alerting us to the arbitrariness of linguistic categories and divisions. Religion and poetry generally thrive on that reminder. Enlightenment rationalism, with its stress on the rigidity of the categories through which we perceive and express the world, does not. It is no coincidence either that the first insane asylums also date from the Enlightenment.'8 Reason, scandalized by madness and by the precariousness of the line that divides it from itself, refuses the dialogue with unreason, segregates, confines, forgets it, to achieve the dubious conviction of its own sanity. But as Dostoievsky would later say in his Diary of a Writer, "It is not by confining one's neighbor that one is convinced of one's own sanity." Neither do we for all our efforts sanctify the language of so-called common sense by vilifying the pun. This admittedly hurried reflection on punning, madness, our taboos, on the uncomfortable interstices between our neat mental categories, prompted by Borges' Chinese encyclopaedia, however playful it is, conveys a profoundly serious truth: the fundamentally conventional, arbitrary, culturally shaped character of our most basic perceptions. That truth is a good propaedeutic to the serious study of myth.
What I am suggesting is based on a large assumption: that all human social behavior-the way we eat, dress, choose sexual partners, worship, paint pictures (and look at them), tell stories, etc., is patterned into codes with the characteristics of language. Now I hope you will begin to see the point of my earlier references to the Huck Finn dialogue, to the Celestial Emporium, and more particularly to something which may have struck you as unusual or unclear, because unexplained until now-that is, my references to ways of eating, dressing, telling stories, and so forth as modes of discourse, ways of communicating, analogous to language. It is only when you understand what is meant when I speak of these forms of behavior as discourse that you will understand what I should like to say about myth: that it too is a mode of discourse, but not because it uses language; that it has a grammar which is not the grammar of the language in which it may be narrated, although it is analogous to linguistic grammar. It also has its taboos, but they are not the taboos of other cultural codes; in fact, myth as a story about what happened in the strange and distant past provides a tool for openly inspecting and even for incorporating the otherwise uncomfortable and unspeakable border area, the tabooed interstices. Wherefore, the high incidence of sexual and excremental preoccupations in truly primitive myth, and its systematic expurgation in summaries like Bulfinch. But we are getting ahead of ourselves. Our subject is discourse and its grammaticality.
"Whether a certain combination of words (of other semantic units) is or is not grammatical is a question that can only be answered by reference to a particular system of rules which either generates it (and thus defines it to be grammatical) or fails to generate it (and thereby defines it to be ungrammatical)." That is how a structural linguist conceives of grammaticality.'9 To be in search of a grammar for the language of myth would mean to be in search of the smallest number of rules which generate acceptable combinations of whatever in stories are analogous to lexical units in language. With refinement it produced occasional lucidity, but its typical output was something "floating in that curious and provocative nether-world between meaning and no-meaning," for example:
Needless to say, during the upheaval which will have warranted the secrecy, the replies do not separate the Orient. Of course, the countries, ipso facto, are always probing liberty. be located in a class of nouns capable of modification by a class of adjectives to which "colorless" belongs, but not by the class of adjectives to which "green" belongs, and certainly not by both at the same time.
When we get to what we may call the vestimentary code the same kinds of rules apply: rules restricting possible combinations of "vestimemes"-if we can give that name to the "lexical" units of this system. It would be ungrammatical to wear a top hat with jeans and sneakers; blacktie on the beach would be as ungrammatical as bikini at the ball (al- Nor should I forget the koro, a whitish worm that pullulates in the trunks of certain trees when they begin to rot. The Indians now refuse to admit that they enjoy eating these creatures: such is the effect of the white man's continual teasing. . . All this makes it difficult actually to watch the koro-extractors at their work. We spent a considerable time plotting and planning how best to achieve it. One old fever-stricken Indian whom we found, all by himself in an abandoned village, seemed just the man to help us; we put an axe in his hand and tried to push or prod him into action. But to no avail: he feigned not to know what we were after. As a last inducement we told him that we were ourselves longing to taste koro. Eventually we got him to a suitable trunk, and with one blow of the axe he cut down to where, deep in the hollow of the tree, a network of canals lay waiting. In each was a fat white creature, not unlike a silk-worm. Now it was up to us; and the Indian looked on impassively while I cut off the head of the worm. The body oozed a whitish substance which I tasted, not without some hesitation. It has the smoothness and consistency of butter and the flavor of coconut-milk.
What is food? Not an easy question, says Edmund Leach: "The physical environment of any human society contains a vast range of materials which are both edible and nourishing, but, in most cases, only a small part of this edible environment will actually be classified as potential food. Such classification is a matter of language and culture, not of nature." 26 It is normally as unacceptable and unsafe to discuss at table other cultures' eating habits as to describe some particularly gruesome
